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Abstract—This paper proposes a novel energy sharing mech-
anism for prosumers who can produce and consume. Different
from most existing works, the role of individual prosumer as
a seller or buyer in our model is endogenously determined.
Several desirable properties of the proposed mechanism are
proved based on a generalized game-theoretic model. We show
that the Nash equilibrium exists and is the unique solution of an
equivalent convex optimization problem. The sharing price at the
Nash equilibrium equals to the average marginal disutility of all
prosumers. We also prove that every prosumer has the incentive
to participate in the sharing market, and prosumers’ total cost
decreases with increasing absolute value of price sensitivity.
Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium approaches the social optimal
as the number of prosumers grows, and competition can improve
social welfare.
Index Terms—Energy sharing, game theory, Nash equilibrium,
prosumer, supply-demand function
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices and Sets
i/n Index of prosumers/resources.
k Index of resources of a prosumer.
I /N Set of prosumers/resources.
S /D Set of sellers/buyers.
Ki Set of resources of prosumer i.
fi(·) Disutility function of prosumer i.
si(·) Sharing cost function of prosumer i.
mdi(·) Marginal disutility of prosumer i.
Πi(·) Total cost function of prosumer i.
Xi Action set of player i, and X =∏i Xi.
Γi(·) Cost function of the sharing game.
B. Parameters
I/N Number of prosumers/resources.
D0i Fixed amount of energy prosumer i consumes.
p0i The amount of energy i generates originally.
pr0i Forecast output of random generation device i.
∆pr0i Deviation of random generation device i.
E0i The amount of energy bought from the grid by i.
Di Required load reduction for prosumer i.
ci,di Disutility function coefficients for prosumer i.
cki ,d
k
i Disutility coefficients of resource k of prosumer i.
D,D Lower/upper bound of Di.
c,c Lower/upper bound of ci.
d,d Lower/upper bound of di.
a Price sensitivity of prosumers.
Ki Number of resources of prosumer i.
α Proportion of total cost reduction paid to platform.
C. Decision Variables
pi Output adjustment of prosumer i.
λc Sharing market clearing price.
bi Willingness to buy/pay of prosumer i.
b¯ Average purchase desire of all prosumers.
qi Amount of energy bought/sell from/to the market.
pki Output adjustment of resource k of prosumer i.
ξ ,ξ ′ Dual variable of the energy balance equation of
the equivalent central decision-making problem.
D. Abbreviations
DER Demand-side energy resource.
SDF Supply-demand function.
GNG Generalized Nash game.
NE Nash equilibrium.
MRP Multi-resource prosumer.
IDL Individual.
SMK Sharing market.
SCO Social optimal.
PoA Price of anarchy.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE proliferation of distributed wind and solar powerhas endowed traditional consumers with the capability
of generation, precipitating the advent of “prosumers” [1].
Local trading among prosumers may provide the system with
additional flexibility [2]. Usually, prosumers are managed in a
centralized manner. As the number of prosumers continues
to increase, management inefficiency and potential conflict
of interests may move the prosumer management towards
a distributed and scalable way. In such a circumstance, the
mismatch of supply and demand for individual prosumer turns
out to be a core issue and the surplus energy trading among
prosumers becomes a must [3]. Different from traditional
consumers, prosumers can choose either to buy or sell energy,
motivating new market mechanisms for supporting flexible
energy exchanging among prosumers.
Nowadays, online platforms and applications have enabled
resource sharing in more and more sectors [4], such as ride-
sharing (e.g., Uber, Lyft), room-sharing (e.g., AirBnB), and
workplace-sharing (e.g., Upwork). These sharing platforms
allow people to provide their idle goods to someone in need
for a profit. Existing studies in economics have investigated
the operation of product sharing [5]. These successes motivate
a new paradigm of energy utilization in power systems, where
energy prosumers share their energy in a similar way [6].
The main difficulty of sharing platform construction is the
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design of an appropriate sharing mechanism, which means
how to provide the energy, how to clear the market, and how to
allocate the revenue. Performance of typical sharing platforms
is studied in [7], and the influence of prices and subsidies in
[8]. A review of sharing economy can be found in [9].
For energy sharing, the potential of game-theoretic ap-
proaches was summarized in [10], including the applications
in electric vehicles (EV), demand-side energy resource (DER)
and storage managements. The economic efficiencies of indi-
vidual, sharing and aggregation schemes were quantitatively
compared in [11], showing that energy sharing can achieve
near-optimal efficiency without a central coordinator, which
is a promising scheme for future energy market organization.
Random sharing clearing price in a storage investment problem
was characterized in [12] using a simplified time-of-use (TOU)
model. Above work initially explores the problem and oppor-
tunity of sharing in smart grid, and the models are relatively
abstract and simple. More detailed analytical studies related to
resource sharing can be roughly cast into the following three
categories. Here, “side” refers to the role of market participant
(as a seller or a buyer) as in [13], [14].
Two-sided market with clearing price. The sellers report
the amount of products to share or their cost coefficients; the
buyers report the amount of products they want or the money
they are willing to pay. With these bids, the third-party sharing
platform solves an optimization problem with the objective
of social welfare or self-revenue maximization and clears the
market. Ref. [15] provided insights into the tradeoff between
revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. The
connection between clearing price and the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism was analyzed in [16]. Incentive
design for electric vehicle-to-vehicle charge sharing was inves-
tigated in [17]. System constraints can be taken into account in
the two-sided market analysis. However, since the supply and
demand statuses of participants are predetermined, it cannot
fully capture the behaviors of prosumers who can choose to
buy or sell changeably.
Single-sided market with set price. Different from the
two-sided market, it assumes that the roles of all participants
are symmetric. The benefits from sharing are distributed
among prosumers via prices set by the sharing platform. An
hour-ahead optimal sharing pricing model for photovoltaic
(PV) prosumers was proposed based on a Stackelberg game
[18]. Uncertainty was further taken into account in [19] with
two kinds of sharing schemes, i.e., the direct sharing (within
one time period) and the buffered sharing (across different time
periods). Stackelberg model was also used in [20] to study the
bounded rationality of prosumers. The results under traditional
expected utility theory and prospect theory were analyzed and
compared. Another research focus was the peer-to-peer (P2P)
energy sharing [21]–[23]. In the above studies, the sharing
prices are set by the platform via solving a Stackelberg game,
in which the upper level is the platform’s pricing problem and
the lower level prosumers’ decision making problems. The
impact of one prosumer’s strategy on the other prosumers’
decisions is not fully captured.
Single-sided market with re-allocation. In this kind of
sharing, the benefit distribution is achieved via re-allocation
Single-sided market 
with set-price 
Single-sided market 
with reallocation 
Two-sided market 
Participant’s free 
choice of role 
No need of 
predesigned 
reallocation rule 
Participants’ 
interaction 
Our work 
Fig. 1. Comparison of our work with current studies.
instead of price regulation. The main difficulty stems from the
design of re-allocation schemes. The renowned VCG mech-
anism [24] could be regarded as an example. Although the
VCG re-allocation approach is ease to implement, it is not self-
budget balancing as extra bonuses outside the sharing market is
required. A cost re-allocation method for a group of electricity
storages was presented in [25], resulting in a cooperative
game. A coalitional game based algorithm was proposed in
[26] for energy exchange among microgrids. A conceptual
design for the DERs sharing was proposed in [27], where
an aggregator coordinates all DERs in real-time operation
and evaluates coordination surplus, which is split between
aggregators and prosumers. However, the redistribution after a
sharing transaction is difficult in practice, as it requires some
private information of individual participants, e.g. the storage
capacity or the cost coefficients.
Taking into account the unique features of the energy
system, the requirements for an energy sharing market are as
follows. The advantages of our work over existing studies are
compared from three aspects as in Fig. 1.
1) Each prosumer is free to sell or buy. Compared with
the “two-sided market”, where the roles of participants are
predetermined, the prosumers in our model are symmetric,
which is in more accordance with the reality. Whether a
prosumer will become a seller or a buyer is endogenously
determined. To be specific, each prosumer only needs to bid
a bi, showing his willingness to buy. It has been proved that
when a prosumer has less willingness to buy, he naturally
becomes a seller; otherwise, he is a buyer.
2) The interaction among prosumers is fully activated.
With more and more prosumers, the online platform has
been changing its role from a control center to a supporting
platform. In the “single-sided market with set-price”, the
platform decides the price and prosumers act only as price-
takers, which discourages the enthusiasm of prosumers to
participate in sharing. In our model, each prosumer makes
strategic bidding and the platform clears the market according
to these bids, which creates sufficient incentives to encourage
the participation of prosumers in sharing.
3) The sharing mechanism is easy to implement with good
properties. Compared with the “single-sided market with real-
location”, our mechanism does not require private information
and the market clearing rule is simple and transparent. Also,
it possesses several provable properties, such as the existence
and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium as well as the achievement
of a Pareto improvement, to name a few.
This paper proposes a simple energy sharing mechanism
based on generalized demand bidding. It is similar to the
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supply function bidding [28], [29] in demand response pro-
grams. Under this mechanism, each seller submits his supply
function to the auctioneer, then a market clearing price is set
according to the submitted supply functions and the expected
total load shedding. Supply function bidding can fully capture
the impact of a seller’s bid on his contracted quantity as well
as the clearing price, and is effective in competitive markets
[30]. A mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints
(MPEC) was used to depict the strategic bidding of a single-
firm in [31] and an iterative algorithm was adopted to obtain
the equilibrium with multiple firms. The demand response
program is modeled as two noncooperative games, one among
suppliers based on supply function bidding mechanism, and
the other among customers [32]. When it comes to the sharing
market, the problem is more complicated in the following two
aspects which are included in our framework: 1) instead of
selling only, the prosumers weigh between self-consumption
and sharing; 2) sellers and buyers, as well as other equilibrium
quantities, are endogenously determined and their roles can
change over time. In this regard, we generalize the supply
function to a generic supply-demand function (SDF), based on
which we build a sharing mechanism for energy prosumers.
This work possesses three salient features:
1) New mechanism for energy sharing. An effective shar-
ing mechanism based on a generic supply-demand function is
proposed. In contrast to the “two-sided market” based analysis,
each participant is free to act as a seller or a buyer, aiming to
minimize his own disutility. Instead of setting price directly
as in the “single-sided market with set price”, the platform
supports and balances mutual impacts among prosumers. The
model that encapsulates the decision making of prosumers
turns out to be a generalized Nash game (GNG), which is
further reduced to a standard Nash game. The existence of a
unique Nash equilibrium is proved.
2) Provable properties of the sharing mechanism. Prop-
erties of the sharing equilibrium price are presented. It is
proved that a Pareto improvement can be achieved, implying
that every prosumer’s cost under sharing is never worse than
that under individual decision-making. Thus, all prosumers
have motivation to take part in sharing. Moreover, the total
cost of all prosumers decreases with the increase of price
sensitivity, and the sharing market will eventually lead to
the same outcome as the social optimum with more and
more prosumers. It is also revealed that the proposed sharing
mechanism is budget self-balancing and no private information
is needed for re-allocation. This makes it easier to implement
compared with the re-allocation based schemes.
3) Impacts of competition on social efficiency. To simplify
the analyses, the basic model of our mechanism is based on
a perfectly monopolistic competition situation, in which every
prosumer controls only one resource. We further investigate
a more realistic case, in which a prosumer could possess
multiple resources. A special case provides a proof of concept
that spreading the resources among more prosumers subject to
some appropriate rules may further reduce the social cost.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The mathe-
matical formulation of energy prosumers and description of
the energy sharing mechanism are presented in Section II.
Some basic properties of the sharing game are given in Section
III. The impact of competition on social welfare is studied in
Section IV. Some possible extensions are provided in Section
V and illustrative examples in Section VI. Finally, conclusions
are summarized in Section VII.
II. GAME MODEL OF ENERGY SHARING
A. Energy Prosumers
In this paper, we consider the decision-making problems of
a set of prosumers I , indexed by i ∈I = {1,2..., I}. There
are N kinds of resources, indexed by n ∈N = {1,2, ...,N},
which can be a distributed generator (DG), virtual power plant
(VPP), and etc. First, we consider the case under perfectly
monopolistic competition market, where each prosumer i owns
one kind of resource, and we have I = N. To distinguish from
the case under imperfect monopolistic competition market,
we use N to represent the number of prosumers here. The
fixed amount of energy prosumer i consumes is D0i , and is
satisfied by the energy it generates p0i , as well as the energy
bought from the grid E0i . These prosumers take part in a
demand response program, and the required load reduction
for prosumer i is a given value Di (D ≤ Di ≤ D), which
means the amount of energy it bought from the grid needs
to be reduced by Di. Each prosumer changes its resource
output to meet the load adjustment. For example, to reduce
its load by Di > 0, prosumer i needs to increase output by
Di. Any deviation from the original operating point will cause
disutility. The disutility function of prosumer i is a quadratic
function fi(pi) = ci p2i +di pi, where pi is the output adjustment
of resource, and 0 < c ≤ ci ≤ c, 0 < d ≤ di ≤ d are the cost
coefficients. The quadratic utility function is widely adopted in
smart grid analysis [33]. Here we choose a quadratic function
because it has some properties that well fit the characteristic of
prosumer’s disutility, i.e., both increasing and decreasing the
output result in disutility; the prosumer’s marginal disutility
grows with increasing adjustment.
Generally, a demand response program of a utility company
roughly consists of two main decisions: the first is how much
of the total demand to adjust and how to allocate the total
adjustment to prosumers in its service territory, and the second
is how the prosumers fulfill the allocated load adjustment.
The typical non-price based demand response addresses the
first problem, while our model focuses on the second one.
To be specific, first, the load adjustment requirement is sent
to the utility from the bulk grid. Sufficient/insufficient load
shed can be rewarded/penalized based on a contract. The
utility operator solves an optimization problem to determine
how much each prosumer should adjust considering these
financial terms. Then, given the load adjustment requirement
Di, traditionally, each prosumer simply fulfill this command
by reducing its own load by Di as requested. In this paper, we
ask the question, if there is a platform that would allow (but
not force) the prosumers to trade, can they fulfill their required
reductions Di,∀i in a way that is more profitable than without
the sharing market, and if so, how?
When a prosumer i ∈ I takes part in a demand response
program individually, there is no room for optimization since
pi = Di is clearly the solution. The corresponding cost is
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fi(Di). However, this result may not be the most efficient if
prosumers with different marginal disutilities are allowed to
trade with others. In this context, the design of an effective
profit allocation scheme, from which all prosumers take part in
sharing can benefit, is desired. The traditional supply function
bidding in demand response program cannot be applied be-
cause of the simultaneous non-deterministic clearing quantity
and clearing price as a prosumer can changeably act as either
a producer or a consumer. Hence a more general bidding
mechanism, which can reflect prosumers’ willingness to buy
or sell energy while determining both the clearing quantity
and price, are necessary.
B. Generic Supply-Demand Function
In this subsection, we propose a generic supply-demand
function by generalizing the conventional supply function, so
as to consider the situation where the participant can flexibly
change his role between a seller and a buyer.
In the sharing market, the demand (or supply) function [31]
of each prosumer can be expressed by
qi = aiλc+bi (1)
where λc is the market clearing price, qi is the amount of
energy (qi > 0 means he is a buyer and gets energy from the
sharing market, qi < 0 means he is a seller and sells energy to
the sharing market). ai < 0 represents price sensitivity and bi
shows his willingness to buy. For simplification, we assume all
prosumers have the same price sensitivity, i.e. ai = a < 0, i ∈
N . The average purchase desire is defined as b¯ = (∑i bi)/N.
The market clears when the net quantity ∑i qi = 0 and the
obtained sharing price is
λc =−∑i bi/(Na) =−b¯/a (2)
Here, bi ≥ b¯ implies prosumer i is more willing to buy than
the average. We have qi = aλc + bi ≥ 0, and the prosumer
appears to be a buyer. Similarly, a prosumer who has less
willingness to buy than the average (bi ≤ b¯) turns to be a seller
(qi ≤ 0). Therefore, the statuses of prosumers are determined
spontaneously by their purchase desires, which enables a
simple but effective sharing mechanism, as we explain.
Remark 1: The assumption that universal price sensitivity
is used can be justified from the following perspectives.
1) Physical and Implementation Interpretation. Here,
we conjecture that prosumers within a utility usually have
similar price sensitivities, so it is acceptable to assume a
universal price sensitivity for simplification. Even with such
an assumption, the personal character of each prosumer is still
retained since the prosumer can accordingly adjust his bid bi
to show his willingness to buy. In fact, the a can be regarded
as the price sensitivity of the whole sharing market, reflecting
how the prosumers’ total bid ∑i∈I bi influences the sharing
price. Moreover, when it comes to application, different ai
is a private information and hard to accurately obtain. The
universal a can be regarded as a parameter in the set rule
for market clearing and as proved later in Proposition 2, even
though this universal a does not match each prosumer’s price
sensitivity accurately, he is still willing to take part in sharing.
Smart 
Meter
Smart 
Meter
Smart 
Meter
Prosumer 1 Prosumer 2 Prosumer I
Platform
…
𝑰 𝑰 𝑰𝟐 𝟐 𝟐𝟏 𝟏 𝟏
𝟏
𝟐 𝑰𝒄 𝒄
𝒄
𝟏 𝟏 𝟐 𝟐 𝑰 𝑰  

 
 

  
Fig. 2. Framework of the proposed sharing mechanism.
2) Model and Properties Extension. Admittedly, it’d be
a less restrictive model if we allow ai to be heterogeneous.
Though we might not be able to prove some special proper-
ties of equilibrium, the sharing mechanism itself extends to
heterogeneous ai. To be specific, we can allow different but
fixed ai,∀i, with each prosumer still only bidding his bi. The
clearing condition in (2) becomes (3) and the sharing game as
well as Proposition 1-3 in this paper extends accordingly.
λc =−∑i bi/∑i ai (3)
For Proposition 4, We run some simulations with heteroge-
neous ai in Section VI.B to show that it approximately holds.
C. Energy Sharing Mechanism
There are N prosumers in the sharing game on a supporting
platform. Each prosumer is connected to the platform via a
smart meter with a bidirectional information channel as in
Fig.2. The information flow of the sharing game is as follows.
Step 1: Each prosumer inputs his cost coefficients ci,di, and
the required load reduction Di to the smart meter. These data
are kept private and will not be accessed by the platform or
other prosumers. Estimate the value of price sensitivity a via
historical data. Initialize λc = 0.
Step 2: The smart meter i decides a bid bi via the embedded
optimization problem (9) with λc (from which it can deduce
∑ j 6=i b j) and sends it to the platform.
Step 3: After receiving all the bids bi,∀i, the platform clears
the market by setting price to λc(b)=−∑i bi/(Na) and returns
the sharing price λc to each smart meter.
Step 4: If the sharing price λc remains the same as in the
last iteration, go to Step 5; otherwise, back to Step 2 with the
updated λc.
Step 5: The average purchase desire is b¯ = ∑i bi/N. The
smart meter calculates the self-production pi and sharing
amount qi(b), sends it back to prosumer i and the prosumer
executes it. If bi ≥ b¯, qi(b) ≥ 0, which means prosumer i
will buy qi(b) from the sharing market and his payment
is λc(b)qi(b). Otherwise, if bi ≤ b¯, qi(b) ≤ 0, which means
prosumer i will sell −qi(b) to the sharing market and he
will get −λc(b)qi(b). It is worth noting that, since qi(b)≤ 0,
−qi(b) is a positive quantity and selling −qi(b) indicates the
prosumer is a seller.
Under this setting, as shown in Fig.2, prosumer i only needs
to provide his private information (ci,di,Di) to his own smart
meter, which will not be known by other prosumers or the
platform, and so privacy is well preserved. Besides, Instead
of a one-time bidding, an iterative process is adopted where
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all smart meters bid bi,∀i to the platform, then the platform
clears the market and sends λc back to each smart meter, and
then the smart meters adjust their bids, and so on, until the
equilibrium is reached.
The sharing market clears when
∑i∈S (−qi) =∑i∈D qi (4)
S is the set of sellers, D is the set of buyers. Each prosumer
i belongs to either S or D , which means I =S ∪D . Hence
equation (4) also implies
∑i∈I (aλc+bi) = 0 (5)
The proposed sharing mechanism is essentially a kind of
auction approach. Other examples of auction approach in
economy are English auction, Dutch auction and first-price
sealed-bid auction, to name a few. However, these auction
approaches are designed for many participants competing for
one thing, while in this paper, each prosumer gets some
amount of energy.
D. Energy Sharing as A Generalized Nash Game
It is easy to verify that the setting price λc(b) clears
the market. When participating in the sharing market, the
optimization problem of each prosumer i ∈I becomes
min
pi,bi
Πi := ci p2i +di pi+(aλc(b)+bi)λc(b) (6a)
s.t. pi+aλc(b)+bi = Di (6b)
∑i (aλc(b)+bi) = Naλc+∑i bi =0 (6c)
Here, Πi(pi,bi,b−i) is the cost function, which can be divided
into two parts: the disutility in terms of money fi(pi) := ci p2i +
di pi and the sharing cost si(b) := (aλc+bi)λc. (6b) represents
the energy balancing. (6c) is the sharing market clearing
condition, which appears in every prosumer’s problem. Due
to the common constraint (6c), problem (6) constitutes a
generalized Nash game (GNG), where players’ payoffs and
strategy sets depend on each other.
In summary, the sharing game consist of the following
elements: 1) the set of prosumers I = {1,2, ..., I}; 2) ac-
tion sets Xi(p−i,b−i)1,∀i, and strategy space X = ∏i Xi; 3)
cost functions Γi(pi,bi, p−i,b−i),∀i. For simplicity, we use
G = {I ,X ,Γ} to denote the sharing game in an abstract form.
III. PROPERTIES OF THE SHARING GAME
A. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In this subsection, we show that the GNG model of the
energy sharing problem can be reduced into a standard Nash
game, and we prove the existence and uniqueness of its
equilibrium.
Denote by b j the bids of other prosumer j ( j 6= i). From
(6c), we have
λc(b) =− biNa −
∑ j 6=i b j
Na
(7)
Substituting into (6b) yields
pi = Di− N−1N bi+
∑ j 6=i b j
N
(8)
1The subscribe −i means all players in I except i
Using bi to represent pi and λc(b), the GNG (6) degenerates
into an equivalent standard Nash game (9).
min
bi
ci
(
Di− N−1N bi+
∑ j 6=i b j
N
)2
+di
(
Di− N−1N bi+
∑ j 6=i b j
N
)
+
(
−bi
N
− ∑ j 6=i b j
N
+bi
)(
− bi
Na
− ∑ j 6=i b j
Na
)
(9)
Direct computation shows that, the second derivative of the
objective function is 2
[
ci
(N−1
N
)2− N−1N2a ] > 0, implying each
prosumer solves a strictly convex optimization.
Definition 1. (Nash Equilibrium) A strategy profile (p∗,b∗)∈
X is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the sharing game G =
{I ,X ,Γ}2, if ∀i ∈I
Γi(p∗i ,b
∗
i , p
∗
−i,b
∗
−i)≤ Γi(pi,bi, p∗−i,b∗−i),∀(pi,bi) ∈ Xi(p∗−i,b∗−i)
Specially, in the sharing game (6), the action set and the
objective function of prosumer i are independent of p−i, so
Xi(p−i,b−i) reduces to Xi(b−i), and Γi(pi,bi, p−i,b−i) reduces
to Πi(pi,bi,b−i). Given p, define λ˜ (p) := 1N ∑i(2ci pi+di) and
b˜i(p) := Di− pi−aλ˜ (p). We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique NE for the sharing game
(6). Moreover, a strategy profile (p∗,b∗) is the unique NE if
and only if, ∀i ∈I , p∗i is the unique solution of:
min
pi,∀i ∑i
(
ci− 12(N−1)a
)
p2i +
(
di+
Di
(N−1)a
)
pi (10a)
s.t. ∑i pi =∑i Di : ξ (10b)
and b∗i = b˜i(p∗).
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 is fundamental since it ensures that the proposed
sharing game is well defined. Furthermore, it implies that
the NE computation can be greatly simplified into solving a
simpler optimization problem (10), which is strictly convex.
B. Incentives for Prosumers’ Participation
The next proposition shows that all prosumers are incen-
tivized to share by comparing the costs of the individual
decision-making and the sharing game (6) at equilibrium.
Let Πi(p∗i ,b∗) be the cost of prosumer i at the NE of sharing
game G = {I ,X ,Π} defined by (6), and fi(Di) the cost of
prosumer i with his individual optimal decision.
Proposition 2. We have
Πi(p∗i ,b
∗)≤ fi(Di),∀i ∈I (11)
moreover, (11) holds with strictly inequality for at least one i
unless the unique optimal solution of (10) is p∗i = Di,∀i.
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix B.
It says that with the proposed sharing mechanism, a Pareto
improvement can be achieved for all prosumers, since the
cost of each prosumer is no worse than making decisions
2Given a collection of xi for i in a certain set A, x denotes the vector
x := (xi; i ∈ A) of a proper dimension with xi as its components
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individually. Hence, the sharing mechanism provides positive
incentives for prosumers to participate in the sharing market.
It is worth noting that, a Pareto improvement is achieved for
all prosumers via energy sharing, but it is not necessarily a
Pareto optimum. In game theory, every player takes strategic
action under rationality, resulting in a Nash equilibrium, which
is usually not Pareto optimal [34]. This does not contradict to
our conclusion here.
C. Sharing Price and Prosumers’ Behavior
In this subsection, we clarify the relationship between the
sharing price λc that clears the market and prosumer’s marginal
disutility, as well as the resulting prosumers’ behaviors.
Definition 2. (Marginal Disutility) The marginal disutility of
prosumer i, denoted by mdi, is defined as
mdi(pi) :=
∂ fi(pi)
∂ pi
= 2ci pi+di
Proposition 3. Assume (p∗,b∗) is the NE of the sharing game
(6). Then
1) the sharing price at equilibrium is given by
λ ∗c =
1
N∑i
mdi(p∗i );
2) mdi(p∗i )> λc(b∗) if and only if qi(b∗)> 0.
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in Appendix C.
Proposition 3 says that, the clearing price at the NE is simply
the average marginal disutility of all prosumers participating
in the sharing market. Moreover, the prosumer whose marginal
disutility is larger than the average (which equals λc) has
qi(b∗) > 0 and hence will buy energy, while whose marginal
cost is lower than the average has qi(b∗)< 0 and hence will sell
energy. Under the proposed sharing mechanism, a prosumer
with higher/lower marginal disutility adjusts less/more and
purchases/sells in the sharing market.
D. Social Efficiency
To investigate the social efficiency of the proposed sharing
mechanism, consider the social planner’s problem:
min
pi,∀i∈I
∑i (ci p2i +di pi) (12a)
s.t. ∑i pi =∑i Di (12b)
Definition 3. (Socially Optimal) p¯ is socially optimal if p¯ is
the unique optimal solution of (12).
Optimal solution of (12) is different from that under indi-
vidual decision-making, except for the case in which pi = Di
∀i ∈ I happens to be the optimal solution to problem (12).
The difference in their optimal values interprets the loss of
social welfare. Next we reveal that the proposed energy sharing
mechanism can effectively reduce the loss of social welfare.
Comparison of (10) in Proposition 1 with the social plan-
ner’s problem (12) suggests that the NE of the sharing problem
(6) might approach social optimality as N→∞. The next result
states this intuition precisely.
Proposition 4. Let (p∗(N),b∗(N)) be the unique NE of (6),
and p¯(N) be the socially optimal solution of (12). Then, we
have
∑i∈I fi(p∗i (N))≥∑i∈I fi(p¯i(N))
and the average cost difference
lim
N→∞
1
N
[
∑i∈I fi(p∗i (N))−∑i∈I fi(p¯i(N))
]
= 0
The proof of Proposition 4 can be found in Appendix D.
The social planner’s problem can be regarded as a utility
maximization approach exerted by a non-profit utility. It
minimizes the disutility of all prosumers. Proposition 4 says
that the proposed sharing mechanism asymptotically converges
to the social optimum when there is a large enough number
of prosumers involved. It is worth noting that Proposition 4
is essentially a sufficient condition. Furthermore, as shown
in Proposition 1 that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in our
sharing game, it can be proved that the price-of-anarchy (PoA)
PoA =
∑i∈I fi(p∗i (N))
∑i∈I fi(p¯i(N))
≤ 1+ β
N
(13)
where β is a positive number. The obtained PoA is in the same
order of magnitude as given in [35], which is 1+1/(N−2).
Similarly, the impact of price sensitivity can be analyzed by
the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let (p∗(a),b∗(a)) be the unique NE of
(6), with price sensitivity equals to a < 0. Then, we have
∑i∈I fi(p∗i (a)) is decreasing in |a|.
The proof of proposition 5 can be found in Appendix E.
It reveals that when the prosumers are more sensitive to the
change of price, the total social cost under sharing decreases
and becomes closer to the social optimal cost. It is worthy
nothing that, because ∑i∈I (aλc + bi)λc = 0 holds, the group
of prosumers are budget self-balancing, which is a main
superiority compared with the VCG mechanism.
Remark 2: Though currently there is no mature sharing
platform for energy sharing in practice yet, it could potentially
be provided in the following ways.
1) Offered by the utility operator. It is proved in Proposition
2 that the cost of each prosumer will never be worse than when
the prosumer does not share so that every prosumer has an
incentive to participate in sharing. At least one prosumer has
a positive cost reduction except for the extreme case where
the individual decisions happen to be the same as the social
optimum. It means that ∆ f := ∑i∈I fi(Di)−∑i∈I fi(p∗i )> 0.
In this context, part of this cost reduction α∆ f (0 < α < 1)
can be taken as a payment to the utility operator and each
prosumer i pays α[ fi(Di)− fi(p∗i )].
2) Offered by a third-party company. In sharing economy,
sometimes a third-party company is willing to provide such
a platform free of charge. Instead of earning money directly
from the prosumers, they make money by other ways such as
putting advertisements on the platform.
3) Offered by a non-profit entity. In some countries, the
power grid is operated by a state-owned company, which aims
to enhance social welfare, other than its profit. As shown in the
paper, a Pareto improvement is achieved via energy sharing.
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It seems reasonable that this non-profit entity may have the
incentive to provide such a platform.
IV. IMPACTS OF COMPETITION
Above analysis assumes a perfectly monopolistic competi-
tion market, where each prosumer owns only one resource.
Next we analyze a more complicated situation, in which
prosumers could own multiple resources.
Assume that there are I multi-resource prosumers (MRPs)
indexed by i ∈ I = {1,2, ..., I}. Each prosumer i owns Ki
kinds of resources labeled by k ∈Ki = {1,2, ...,Ki}. The cor-
responding energy productions are p1i , p
2
i , · · · , pKii . However,
we assume there are still N resources in total, which means
∑i∈I Ki = N. The multi-resource prosumer (MRP) i ∈I can
either carry out the demand response command individually
by solving the following problem
min
pki ,∀k∈Ki
∑k
[
cki
(
pki
)2
+dki
(
pki
)]
(14a)
s.t. ∑k pki = Di (14b)
or take part in the sharing market by solving
min
pki ,∀k∈Ki,bi
∑k
[
cki
(
pki
)2
+dki p
k
i
]
+(aλc+bi)λc(15a)
s.t. ∑k pki +aλc+bi = Di (15b)
∑i(aλc)+∑i bi = 0 (15c)
Following the similar process as in Section III, we can easily
prove that the proposed sharing mechanism can benefit all
MRPs and the equilibrium sharing price reflects the average
marginal disutility.
Definition 4. (Social Optimal for MRP) p¯ is socially optimal
(or the most efficient) if p¯ solves
min
pki ,∀i∈I ,k∈Ki
∑i∑k
[
cki
(
pki
)2
+dki p
k
i
]
(16a)
s.t. ∑i∑k pki =∑i Di (16b)
If I = 1, the sharing problem for MRP (15) becomes the
social optimal problem (16). If I =N, the sharing problem for
MRP (15) degenerates to the sharing problem in the previous
sections. If 1 < I < N, the following propositions hold.
Proposition 6. The marginal disutilities of the resources for
a prosumer are equal, which means3
mdi(pi) := md1i
(
p1i
)
= · · ·= mdKii
(
pKii
)
, ∀i ∈I (17)
Proposition 6 can be directly deduced from the KKT con-
dition. So we omit the proof here.
Given p := (pi,∀i), we define λ˜ (p) := 1I ∑i mdi(pi) and
b˜i(p) := Di − ∑k pki − aλ˜ (p). Then we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 7. There exists a unique NE for the sharing
problem with MRP (15). Moreover, a strategy profile (p∗,b∗)
3 pi denotes the vector pi := (pki ,∀k)
is the unique NE if and only if, ∀i ∈ I , p∗i is the unique
solution of (18).
min
pki ,∀i,k∈Ki
∑i∑k
[(
cki −
1
2(I−1)a
)(
pki
)2
+
(
dki +
Di
(I−1)a
)
pki
]
−
∑
i
∑
j>k∈Ki
pki p
j
i
(I−1)a (18a)
s.t. ∑i∑k pki =∑i Di : ξ ′ (18b)
and b∗i = b˜i(p∗).
The proof of Proposition 7 can be found in Appendix F.
Proposition 7 extends the result of existence and uniqueness
of the NE in the sharing game from the single-resource case
to the multi-resource one, and again provides an effective way
to simplify the computation of NE.
Then we analyze the change in efficiency based on model
(18). Generally speaking, as I varies from 1 to N, the change
in the total social optimal cost may not be monotonous. So
we only consider a special case in which all cki = c,∀k,∀i and
Ki = KI ,∀i and gives the following proposition.
Let (I,KI ,D) denotes a scenario that there are I prosumers,
each has KI resources and the required load adjustment for
prosumer i is Di. Then, the scenario (I
′
,KI′ ,D
′
) is an equal
partition of (I,KI ,D) when there exists an Z ∈ Z+, such
that I
′
= ZI and KI = ZKI′ , the resources one prosumer
possesses and required load adjustment is distributed equally
to Z prosumers and satisfies, ∀i,∀z1,z2 ∈ {1, ...,Z}
(D
′
Z(i−1)+z1 −
K
I′
∑
k=1
pk∗
Z(i−1)+z1
)(D
′
Z(i−1)+z2 −
K
I′
∑
k=1
pk∗
Z(i−1)+z2
)≥ 0
∑Zz=1 D
′
Z(i−1)+z = Di (19)
where p∗ corresponds to the NE under scenario (I,KI ,D).
Definition 5. (Variance of marginal disutility) The variance
of marginal utilities mdk∗i ,∀k ∈KI ,∀i ∈I is defined as
Var(mdk∗i (I), I) :=
1
N
I
∑
i=1
KI
∑
k=1
(mdk∗i −
1
N
I
∑
i=1
KI
∑
k=1
mdk∗i )
2
Proposition 8. Suppose cki = c,∀i ∈ I ,∀k ∈ Ki and
(p∗(I),b∗(I)) is the unique NE of the sharing problem for
MRP (15) with I > 1. For any I prosumers with the same
number of resources, i.e. Ki = KI ,∀i ∈I , there always exists
an equal partition of (I,KI ,D) to (I
′
,KI′ ,D
′
), such that
∑I
′
i=1∑
K
I′
k=1 fik(p
k∗
i (I
′
))≤∑Ii=1∑
KI
k=1 fik(p
k∗
i (I))
Moreover, if −2ac≤ N, then
Var(mdk∗i (I
′
), I
′
)≤Var(mdk∗i (I), I)
The proof can be found in Appendix G. It shows that the
system under I = 1 is the most efficient; otherwise, introducing
competition by spreading resources benefits social welfare.
Proposition 8 only considers a very special case. In Section
IV, we provide empirical results of numerical experiments to
further confirm this property.
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V. POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
This paper considers a simplified situation (power balance)
to study the strategic behavior of individual prosumers in a
sharing scheme. We remark on some possible extensions.
1) Network constraints. Our model is restricted to a
community with a few buildings or microgrids that accounts
for only a small fraction of the total demand at a node of a city-
sized distribution network. In such a situation, it is reasonable
to neglect network constraints as our system is smaller than
a node, as done in [36]–[38]. To incorporate prosumers with
larger capacities that can take part in a distribution market, one
can replace condition (2) with an optimal power flow based
market clearing problem. This is among our undergoing works.
2) Uncertainty. If a prosumer has a random generation
device, assume its output is p˜ri = p
r0
i +∆p
r
i , where p
r0
i is the
forecast output and ∆pri the uncertain deviation. In the day-
ahead stage, E0i is determined according to the forecast value
pr0i and we have p
0
i +E
0
i = Dˆ
0
i (where Dˆ
0
i := D
0
i − pr0i ). Then
in the real-time stage, after the exact output of random devices
and the load reduction requirement Di are known, prosumer i
adjusts the output of his controllable resource by pi to maintain
energy balance, which means p0i + pi+(E
0
i −Di) = Dˆ0i −∆pri .
So we have pi = Di − ∆pri . Since ∆pri is uncertain, the
stochastic optimization approach can be applied to solve this
problem by replacing the objective with the expectation of his
cost. By simply approximating the expectation by a weighted
sum of objective functions under different scenarios, a similar
procedure to that in this paper can be used check that the main
conclusions still hold.
3) Heterogeneous participants. To accommodate hetero-
geneous participants, (1)-(2) can be regarded as set rules in
the sharing market and some constraints can be added to
depict the participant’s feature. For instance, if some of the
prosumers are aggregated, it is equivalent to one aggregated
prosumer owning various resources as in model (15). If the
participant has storage facilities, related constraints [11] can
be included. If the participant has limited adjustable capacity,
bound constraint pi ≤ pi ≤ pi can be added. If, on the other
hand, prosumers have different but fixed ai and still bid on
only bi, then the sharing game generalizes directly with the
sharing price λc = −∑i bi/∑i ai. Moreover, it can be shown
that Propositions 1–3 hold with straightforward modifications.
In Section VI.B we present simulation results that suggest that
the Nash equilibrium may still converge to the social optimal
even with heterogeneous ai (cf Proposition 4).
4) Bounded rationality. In our model, each prosumer is
connected to the platform via a smart meter and the smart
meter bids automatically. In this context, it is reasonable to
assume that the smart meters’ algorithm is designed with
full rationality as long as the information required in com-
putation is available. Still, it might be more practical in
some cases where bounded rationality should be considered
[39] and prospect theory can be adopted to characterize this
phenomenon. Prospect theory extends the traditional expected
utility theory by rewriting the objective function taking into
account the following two aspects: i)Weighting Effect. It has
been found that most people overweight/underweight low/high
probability income . To take this into account, instead of an
270 275 280 285 290 295 300 305
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430
435
440
445
450
455
b1
b2
BRC of prosumer 2
BRC of prosumer 1
Fig. 3. Best response curves of two prosumers.
objective probability p in the stochastic model in 2) above,
a subjective weighting function W (p) can be incorporated.
ii) Framing Effect. People prefer stable incomes, but when
facing losses, they may prefer taking risks to compensate for
losses. The initial wealth will influence people’s utility as well.
To take this into account, a reference point is chosen; the
coefficient ci,di in the model are not necessarily the objective
cost parameters, and the prosumer can input his subjective
parameters instead.
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, numerical experiments are presented to
illustrate theoretical results. First, a simple case is used to
clarify the basic setup. Then, the impacts of several factors
are analyzed, including the number of prosumers, their price
sensitivities as well as the impact of competition.
A. Benchmark Case
The simplest scenario with two prosumers is taken as an
illustrative example. p1 and p2 are the output adjustment of
prosumer 1 and 2. We assume the price sensitivity a =−200,
the cost coefficients c1 = 0.003$/kW 2, d1 = 0.042$/kW and
c2 = 0.006$/kW 2, d2 = 0.072$/kW . The required demand
reduction are D1 = 100kW and D2 = 200kW . The optimal
output adjustments and the corresponding costs when making
decisions individually (IDL), taking part in the sharing market
(SMK) and the social optimal (SCO) are shown in Table I. The
best response curves of two prosumers are shown in Fig.3.
TABLE I
OPTIMAL SOLUTION UNDER IDL, SMK AND SCO
Scheme IDL SMK SCO
Optimal output adjustment p1 (kW) 100 175 216.67
Optimal output adjustment p2 (kW) 200 125 83.33
Cost of prosumer 1 ($) 72 27 231.83
Cost of prosumer 2 ($) 384 322.13 101.67
Social total cost ($) 456 349.13 333.50
Relative cost difference 36.73% 4.68% –
From Table I, we can find that when the prosumers take part
in sharing, their individual costs all decrease (prosumer 1 from
$72 to $27, and prosumer 2 from $384 to $322.13), so does
the social total cost, confirming Proposition 2. The relative
social cost difference 4 between IDL and SCO is 36.73%
while between SMK and SCO is 4.68%, showing that the
sharing mechanism can greatly reduce the social total cost. The
4Relative social cost difference(IDL,SCO)=∑i∈I fi(Di)−∑i∈I fi(p¯i)∑i∈I fi(p¯i) , Rela-
tive social cost difference(SMK,SCO)=∑i∈I fi(p
∗
i )−∑i∈I fi(p¯i)
∑i∈I fi(p¯i)
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. X, FEB. 2019 9
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Number of prosumers (N)
R
el
at
iv
e 
co
st 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
SM
K
 a
nd
 S
CO
 (%
)
60 70 80 90 100
0
0.5
1
1.5
x 10−3
(a) Relative cost difference
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.02
Number of prosumers (N)
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
of
 m
ar
gi
na
l d
isu
til
iti
es
 u
nd
er
 sh
ar
in
g
60 70 80 90 100
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
x 10−6
(b) Variance of marginal disutilities
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Number of prosumers (N)
A
ve
ra
ge
 c
os
t d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
SM
K
 a
nd
 S
CO
 ($
)
 
 
A=1
A=2
A=3
A=4
A=5
A=6
A=7
A=8
A=9
A=10
60 70 80 90 100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
x 10−4
 
 
(c) Gap of average costs under different degree of
heterogeneity
Fig. 4. Results under different N.
intersection of best response curves in Fig.3 gives the sharing
market equilibrium, which is (b1,b2) = (294,444)kW and the
corresponding equilibrium output adjustment is (p1, p2) =
(175,125)kW , which is the same as the results in Table
I offered by the proposed equivalent model (10), verifying
Proposition 1. Compared with the “two-sided market”, our
approach determines the role of a prosumer according to his
willingness. Prosumer 1 becomes a seller because b1 < b¯
while prosumer 2 as a buyer since b2 > b¯. Compared with
the “single-sided market with set-price”, in our model, the
platform only provides the means for prosumers to determine
their own decisions and the sharing price.
B. Impact of the Number of Prosumers
We assume that c = 0.001$/kW−2, c = 0.01$/kW−2, d =
0.02$/kW , d = 0.12$/kW , D= 0kW , D= 1000kW and change
the number N from 2 to 100. The parameters ci, di, Di are
randomly chosen within the upper and lower bounds and 10
scenarios are tested. For each of the 10 random scenario, the
relative cost difference5 is plotted in Fig.4.(a) and the variance
of marginal disutilities6 in Fig. 4.(b), both as functions of N.
In Fig.4.(a), the relative cost differences are all positive,
showing that the cost with sharing is always larger than the
optimal social cost. When N is larger than 60, the relative gap
is less than 1.5× 10−3 and the performance of sharing en-
hances with the number of participants. Moreover, the variance
of marginal disutilities also drops sharply with increasing N,
implying that the marginal disutilities of all prosumers become
closer and all prosumers converge to the social optimum, as
shown in Fig.4.(b). Actually, the relative gap is less than 5%
(the maximum appears at N = 2) and shrinks sharply with the
increase of N in all scenarios, which indicates that the sharing
can achieve a near-optimal solution even with a small N.
We further run some simulations with heterogeneous ai
to show that the key qualitative property, Proposition 4, ap-
proximately holds. The parameters ai,∀i are randomly chosen
within the region [Aa0,0], where a0 is the value of a in
the benchmark case. A can be used to depict the degree of
heterogeneity and we change it from 1 to 10. Under each A
and the chosen ai,∀i, the average cost difference7 between the
SMK and the SCO with different N is plotted in Fig.4.(c). It
5The relative cost difference:= [∑i fi(p∗i (N))−∑i fi(p¯i(N))]/∑i fi(p¯i(N))
6The variance of marginal disutilities:= 1N ∑i(mdi−∑i mdi)2
7The average cost difference:= 1N [∑i fi(p
∗
i (N))−∑i fi(p¯i(N))]
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can be found that the gaps always converge to zero, though
the rate of decrease varies a little.
The computation time using the proposed model (10) is
compared with the traditional iterative based algorithm, which
solves each prosumer’s optimization problem sequentially with
other prosumers’ strategies fixed until convergence. The pa-
rameters ci, di, Di,∀i are randomly chosen within the upper
and lower bounds and the scenarios with N = 2,4,8,16,32
are tested. As shown in Fig.5, when the number of prosumers
grows, the computation time using iterative based algorithm
increases sharply, while the time required by the proposed
algorithm changes little, showing the advantage of our method.
C. Impact of Price Elasticity
When price sensitivity coefficient a varies in [1,3.5] times
of its original value, the social costs under NE ∑i fi(p∗i ) are
shown in Fig. 6. The optimal social cost ∑i fi(p¯i) is marked
by a dash line. From the figure, when the absolute value of a
increases, the social cost under sharing is decreasing and gets
closer to the optimal social cost. This is in accordance with
Proposition 5.
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D. Impact of Competition
A special case, in which all cki = c,∀k,∀i and Ki = KI ,∀i,
is analyzed in Section IV, showing that introducing compe-
tition improves social welfare. However, the general case is
difficult to prove. Here, we test cases with different cki but
the same Ki; and cases with different cki and Ki. We assume
that c = 0.001$/kW−2, c = 0.01$/kW−2, d = 0.02$/kW ,
d = 0.12$/kW , D = 0kW , D = 1000kW . The parameters cki ,
dki and Di are randomly chosen within the ranges and 10
scenarios are tested. The resources are allocated according to
the condition (19) and the way in [40] (for same/different Ki).
To eliminate the impact of scale, relative social cost, which
equals to the ratio of costs with I > 1 and I = 1 minus 1,8 is
used for comparison and its change under different scenarios
with different cki and same/different Ki are given in Fig.7.(a)
and Fig. 7.(b), respectively.
It can be observed from Fig.7.(a) that the relative cost is
the smallest when I = 1, which means all the resources are
owned by one prosumer and the social optimal is achieved.
When I ≥ 2, the relative cost decreases with I, demonstrating
that competition improves economic efficiency as stated in
Proposition 8. This property extends to the case when Ki are
different as shown in Fig. 7.(b).
VII. CONCLUSION
By allowing prosumers to share energy with each other,
the total cost of prosumers can be reduced, enhancing the
social welfare. To promote energy sharing in smart grid, a
simple mechanism is proposed, based on a generic supply-
demand function. It allows prosumers to freely decide whether
they will buy or sell based on their purchase desire. We have
proved that a unique Nash equilibrium exists and the sharing
price in the Nash equilibrium is equal to the average marginal
disutility of the prosumers. We have proved that the proposed
sharing scheme provides incentives for individual prosumers
to participate and that the sharing system converges to the
social optimal as the number of consumers increases. Case
studies have been presented to illustrate the effectiveness of
the proposed sharing mechanism. Future research directions
include incorporating network constraints for larger scale
systems, analyzing the behavior of this mechanism in the
presence of uncertainty due to the integration of renewables
and characterizing the impact of bounded rationality.
8Relative social cost:= ∑
I
i=1∑
KI
k=1 fik(p
k∗
i (I))
∑I
′
=1
i=1 ∑
K
I′
k=1 fik(p
k∗
i (I
′
=1))
−1
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. Given the other prosumers’ bids b j, j 6= i, prosumer
i solves problem (6) to obtain his optimal strategy, which
is equivalent to solving problem (9) with p∗i given by (8).
Problem (9) is a strictly convex optimization problem. Thus,
the KKT condition below is the necessary and sufficient
condition for the optimal solution.
2ci(Di− N−1N bi+
∑ j 6=i b j
N
)(−N−1
N
)− N−1
N
di
+
N−1
N
(− bi
Na
− ∑ j 6=i b j
Na
)− 1
Na
(
N−1
N
bi− ∑ j 6=i
b j
N
) = 0
(A.1)
With (7) and (8), it is equivalent to
2ci pi+di−λc+ 1
(N−1)a (aλc+bi) = 0 (A.2a)
− bi
Na
− ∑ j 6=i b j
Na
= λc (A.2b)
Di− N−1N bi+
∑ j 6=i b j
N
= pi (A.2c)
Problem (10) is also a strictly convex optimization problem
and the KKT condition is
2
[
ci− 12(N−1)a
]
pi+di+
Di
(N−1)a +ξ = 0 (A.3a)
∑
i
pi = ∑
i
Di (A.3b)
⇒ : If (p∗,b∗) is the NE of the sharing game (6), it satisfies
the condition (A.2).
Sum up (A.2c) for all i, we have
∑
i
p∗i =∑
i
Di (A.4)
which means (A.3b) is satisfied.
By a× (A.2b) + (A.2c), we have
Di− p∗i = aλ ∗c +b∗i (A.5)
Substitute (A.5) into (A.2a), we have
2[ci− 12(N−1)a ]p
∗
i +di+
Di
(N−1)a −λ
∗
c = 0 (A.6)
Let ξ :=−λ ∗c , constraint (A.3a) is satisfied. As a result, p∗ is
the optimal solution of (10).
Obviously, we have b∗i = Di− p∗i −aλ ∗c . λ ∗c = 1N ∑
i
(2ci p∗i +
di) will be proved latter in Appendix C.
⇐: If p∗ is the optimal solution of problem (10), then by
letting
pi = p∗i (A.7a)
λc = −ξ ∗ = 1N∑i
(2ci p∗i +di) (A.7b)
bi = Di− p∗i −aλc (A.7c)
(A.2a) is obviously satisfied. Sum up (A.7c) and together with
(A.3b) gives (A.2b) and (A.2c). It satisfied the condition (A.2).
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. Under SDF-based sharing mechanism, given other pro-
sumers strategies b j, j 6= i, by choosing
pi = Di, bi =
∑ j 6=i b j
(N−1)
with
λc =− ∑ j 6=i
b j
(N−1)a
We have Πi(pi,b) = fi(Di), which means prosumer i can
acheive the same cost as under individual decision-making.
Because each prosumer solves a minimization problem, so that
we always have Π(p∗i ,b∗)≤ fi(Di). In consequence, a Pareto
improvement is achieved for all prosumers.
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If p∗i = Di does not hold for all i, then as p∗ is the unique
optimal solution of problem (10), we always have
∑
i
(ci(p∗i )
2+di p∗i )−∑
i
(p∗i −Di)2
2(N−1)a <∑i
(ciD2i +diDi) (B.1)
and becasue ∑
i
Π(p∗i ,b∗) = ∑
i
fi(p∗i ), so we have
∑
i
Π(p∗i ,b
∗)
< ∑
i
fi(Di)+∑
i
(p∗i −Di)2
2(N−1)a
< ∑
i
fi(Di) (B.2a)
so that at least one strict inequality of (11) holds. This
completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof. If (p∗,b∗) is the NE of the sharing game (6), then it
satisfies the conditions (A.2).
1) Sum up (A.2c) for all i, and together with (A.5), we have
∑
i
(aλ ∗c +b
∗
i ) = 0 (C.1)
Sum up (A.2a) for all i and with (C.1), we have
λ ∗c =
1
N∑i
(2ci p∗i +di) =
1
N∑i
mdi(p∗i ) (C.2)
2) Given any b j, j 6= i, let bi(pi) =
−N pi+ ∑
j 6=i
b j+NDi
N−1 be the
unique solution of constaints (6b), (6c). Then, for any fixed
b j, j 6= i, Πi(pi,bi,b−i) =Πi(pi,bi(pi),b−i).
Derivatives of (6b) and (6c) with respect to pi are
1+a
∂λc
∂ pi
+
∂bi
∂ pi
= 0 (C.3)
Na
∂λc
∂ pi
+
∂bi
∂ pi
= 0 (C.4)
Solving the equations we have
∂λc
∂ pi
=
1
(N−1)a
∂bi
∂ pi
= − N
N−1
In consequence, the derivative of Πi(pi,bi(pi),b−i) is
∂Πi
∂ pi
(pi,b−i)
= (2ci pi+di)−
[
λc(bi(pi),b−i)− aλc(bi(pi),b−i)+bi(pi)
(N−1)a
]
(C.5)
The first term 2ci pi+di is the marginal disutility of prosumer i;
the second term λc is the marginal cost he needs to pay when
buying from the market regardless of the mutual impact of
different prosumers; the third term (aλc+bi)/a(N−1) reflects
the marginal profit deviation due to the interest conflicts among
different prosumers.
If mdi(p∗i ) > λc(b∗) and qi(b∗) < 0, then prosumer i can
always choose ∆pi < 0 to reduce his cost, and thus, it is not a
stable situation. Similarly, if mdi(p∗i )< λc(b∗) and qi(b∗)> 0,
the market is also unstable as prosumer i always has a better
choice of ∆pi > 0. As a result, mdi(p∗i )> λc(b∗) if and only
if qi(b∗)> 0. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof. 1) According to Proposition 1, p∗i is the unique solution
of (10) and satisfies ∑
i
p∗i = ∑
i
Di. So p∗i must be a feasible
solution to the social optimal problem (12). As p¯i is the
optimal solution of (12), we always have
∑
i∈I
fi(p∗i )≥ ∑
i∈I
fi(p¯i)
2) With the KKT conditions, we can obtain the optimal
solutions to problem (10) and (12) are
p∗i =
∑
j
D j +∑
j
d j +
D j
a(N−1)
2c j− 1a(N−1)
 12ci− 1a(N−1)
∑
j
1
2c j− 1a(N−1)
−
di+
Di
a(N−1)
2ci− 1a(N−1)
and
p¯i =
(
∑
j
D j +∑
j
d j
2c j
) 1
2ci
∑
j
1
2c j
− di
2ci
respectively. Moreover, we have
p¯i ≤
(
ND¯+N
d¯
2c
)
c¯
cN
− d
2c¯
= (D¯+
d¯
2c
)
c¯
c
− d
2c¯
(D.1a)
p¯i ≥ (ND+N d2c¯ )
c
c¯N
− d¯
2c
= (D+
d
2c¯
)
c
c¯
− d¯
2c
(D.1b)
Letting A¯ := ∑
j
1
2c j
and A∗ := ∑
j
1
2c j− 1a(N−1)
gives
0≤ A¯−A∗ = ∑
j
− 1a(N−1)
2c j(2c j− 1a(N−1) )
= ∑
j
1
2c j−4ac2j(N−1)
≤ N
2c−4ac2(N−1)
≤ − 1
2ac2
(D.2)
Consequently, we have
A¯−A∗
A¯
≤ − c¯
ac2N
(D.3a)
A¯−A∗
A¯
≥ 0 (D.3b)
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Let B¯ := ∑
j
d j
2c j
and B∗ := ∑
j
d j+
D j
a(N−1)
2c j− 1a(N−1)
. Then there are
B¯−B∗ = ∑
j
d j +2c jD j
−4ac2j(N−1)+2c j
≤ ∑
j
|d¯+2 ¯cD|
−4ac2(N−1)+2c
≤ |d¯+2
¯cD|
−2ac2 (D.4a)
B¯−B∗ = ∑
j
d j +2c jD j
−4ac2j(N−1)+2c j
≥ −N|d+2cD|−4ac2(N−1)+2c
≥ −|d+2cD|−2ac2 (D.4b)
Furthermore, it is easy to see
|B∗| ≤ ∑
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d j +
D j
a(N−1)
2ci− 1a(N−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ∑
j
|d j|+ | D ja(N−1) |
2c
≤ ∑
j
d¯−max{|D¯|, |D|}/a
2c
=
d¯−max{|D¯|, |D|}/a
2c
·N (D.5)
Let C¯ := di2ci and C
∗ :=
di+
Di
a(N−1)
2ci− 1a(N−1)
. Direct calculation gives
C¯−C∗ = di+2ciDi−4ac2i (N−1)+2ci
≤ |d¯+2cD|−2c2aN (D.6a)
C¯−C∗ = di+2ciDi−4ac2i (N−1)+2ci
≥ −|d+2cD|−4ac2(N−1)+2c
≥ −|d+2cD|−2c2aN (D.6b)
Let E¯ :=
1
2ci
A¯ and E
∗ :=
1
2ci− 1a(N−1)
A∗ , then we have
E∗ ≤ 12cA∗ ≤
2c¯−1/a
2c
· 1
N
(D.7a)
E∗ ≥
1
2c¯−1/a
A∗ ≥
2c
2c¯−1/a ·
1
N
(D.7b)
and
E¯
E∗
−1 = A
∗
A¯
2ci
2ci− 1a(N−1)
−1
≤ (1− 1
(−2ac¯+1)N )−1
≤ − 1
(−2ac¯+1)N (D.8a)
E¯
E∗
−1 = A
∗
A¯
2ci
2ci− 1a(N−1)
−1
≥
(
1+
c¯
ac2N
)(
1− 1−acN
)
−1
≥ c¯
ac2N
+
1
acN
(D.8b)
Therefore, there must be
E¯−E∗ ≤
(
− 1
(−2ac¯+1)N
)
2c¯−1/a
2c
· 1
N
(D.9a)
E¯−E∗ ≥
(
c¯
ac2N
+
1
acN
)
2c
2c¯−1/a ·
1
N
(D.9b)
The optimal solution of (10) and (12) can be represented as
p¯i =
(
∑
j
D j + B¯
)
E¯−C¯
p∗i =
(
∑
j
D j +B∗
)
E∗−C∗
First, we have∣∣∣∣∣
(
∑
j
D j +B∗
)
(E¯−E∗)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑j D j +B∗
∣∣∣∣∣ |E¯−E∗|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑j D j +B∗
∣∣∣∣∣M3N2
≤ (
∣∣∣∣∣∑j D j
∣∣∣∣∣+ |B∗|)M3N2
≤ (M1N+M2N)M3N2
=
M3(M1+M2)
N
(D.10)
where
M1 = max{|D|, |D¯|}
M2 =
d¯−max{|D¯|, |D|}/a
2c
M3 = max
{∣∣∣∣( 1−2ac¯+1 )2c¯−1/a)2c
∣∣∣∣ ,∣∣∣∣( c¯ac2 + 1ac ) 2c2c¯−1/a
∣∣∣∣} (D.11)
The difference between p¯i and p∗i is
|p¯i− p∗i |
=
∣∣∣∣∣
(
∑
j
D j + B¯
)
E¯−C¯−
(
∑
j
D j +B∗
)
E∗+C∗
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
(
∑
j
D j + B¯
)
E¯−
(
∑
j
D j +B∗
)
E¯
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
(
∑
j
D j +B∗
)
E¯−
(
∑
j
D j +B∗
)
E¯
∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣C¯−C∗∣∣
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= |E¯(B¯−B∗)|+
∣∣∣∣∣
(
∑
j
D j +B∗
)
(E¯−E∗)
∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣C¯−C∗∣∣
≤ c¯
Nc
max
{ |d¯+2 ¯cD|
−2ac2 ,
−|d+2cD|
−2ac2
}
+M3(M1+M2)
1
N
+max
{ |d¯+2cD|
−2c2a ,
|d+2cD|
−2c2a
}
1
N
(D.12)
It is easy to see that |p¯i− p∗i | ≤ αN holds for a large enough
positive number α . Because P≤ p¯i≤ P¯ and −αN ≤ p∗i − p¯i≤ αN ,
where
P =
(
D+
d
2c¯
)
c
c¯
− d¯
2c
P¯ =
(
D¯+
d¯
2c
)
c¯
c
− d
2c¯
as a result, we have
2P−α ≤ 2P− α
N
≤ p∗i + p¯i ≤ 2P¯+
α
N
≤ 2P¯+α (D.13)
For a given ε > 0, we choose a large enough number N0 :=
1
(c¯αmax{|2P−α|,|2P¯+α|}+α d¯)ε . Then for arbitrary number N > N0,
there is
1
N
∣∣∣∣∣∑i∈N fi(p∗i )− ∑i∈N fi(p¯i)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
N∑i
∣∣ci(p∗i )2+di pi− ci(p¯i)2−di p¯i∣∣
≤ c¯
N∑i
|p∗i + p¯i||p∗i − p¯i|+
d¯
N∑i
|p∗i − p¯i|
≤ (c¯αmax{|2P−α|, |2P¯+α|}+α d¯) 1
N
< ε (D.14a)
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof. Suppose that 0 < |a1| < |a2|, and p1∗ corresponds to
the NE of (6) with a = a1, and p2∗ corresponds to the NE
with a = a2. According to Proposition 1, p1∗ and p2∗ are the
unique optimal point of problem (10) under a= a1 and a= a2,
respectively. Due to optimality,
∑i∈I fi(p2∗i )−
∑i∈I (p2∗i −Di)2
2(N−1)a1
≥ ∑i∈I fi(p1∗i )−
∑i∈I (p1∗i −Di)2
2(N−1)a1 (E.1)
which means
2|a1|(N−1)
[
∑i∈I fi(p2∗i )−∑i∈I fi(p1∗i )
]
≥
[
∑
i∈I
(p1∗i −Di)2− ∑
i∈I
(p2∗i −Di)2
]
(E.2)
If we have
∑i∈I fi(p1∗i )<∑i∈I fi(p2∗i )
then
2|a2|(N−1)
[
∑i∈I fi(p2∗i )−∑i∈I fi(p1∗i )
]
≥ 2|a1|(N−1)
[
∑i∈I fi(p2∗i )−∑i∈I fi(p1∗i )
]
≥
[
∑
i∈I
(p1∗i −Di)2− ∑
i∈I
(p2∗i −Di)2
]
(E.3)
which means
∑i∈I fi(p2∗i )−
∑i∈I (p2∗i −Di)2
2(N−1)a2
≥ ∑i∈I fi(p1∗i )−
∑i∈I (p1∗i −Di)2
2(N−1)a2 (E.4)
and is contradict to the assumption that p2∗ corresponds to the
NE under a = a2 (also the optimal solution of problem (10)
under a = a2), which completes the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Proof. Given other prosumers’ strategies, prosumer i solves
problem (15) to obtain his optimal strategy. Use bi to represent
λc, problem (15) can be reduced to the following optimization
problem.
min
pki ,∀k∈Ki,bi
∑k
[
cki
(
pki
)2
+dki p
k
i
]
+
 I−1
I
bi−
∑
j 6=i
b j
I
−bi− ∑j 6=i b j
Ia
(F.1a)
s.t. ∑k pki +
I−1
I
bi− 1I ∑j 6=i
b j = Di : µi (F.1b)
It is easy to check that problem (F.1) is a strictly convex
optimization problem. Thus, the KKT condition below is the
necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal point.
2cki p
k
i +d
k
i +µi = 0,∀k (F.2a)
I−1
I
−bi− ∑j 6=i b j
Ia
+ I−1
I
µi
− 1
Ia
 I−1
I
bi−
∑
j 6=i
b j
I
 = 0 (F.2b)
∑k pki +
I−1
I
bi− 1I ∑j 6=i
b j = Di (F.2c)
The KKT condition of problem (18) is[
2cki −
1
(I−1)a
]
pki +d
k
i
+
Di
(I−1)a −
∑
j∈Ki, j 6=k
p ji
(I−1)a = −ξ
′
(F.3a)
∑
i
∑
k
pki = ∑
i
Di (F.3b)
⇒: If (p∗,b∗) is the NE of the sharing problem for MRP (15),
then it satisfies the KKT conditions (F.2). Sum up the (F.2c)
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for all i, (F.3b) is met. Substitute (F.2b)-(F.2c) into (F.2a), we
have [
2cki −
1
(I−1)a
]
pk∗i +d
k
i +
Di
(I−1)a −
∑
j∈Ki, j 6=k
p j∗i
(I−1)a
= − 1
Ia
(b∗i +∑
j 6=i
b∗j) (F.4)
which is a constant for ∀i,∀k ∈Ki. Let ξ ′ := 1Ia (b∗i + ∑
j 6=i
b∗j),
and (F.3a) is met. In consequence, p∗ is also the optimal
solution of problem (18).
Let λc :=− 1Ia (b∗i + ∑
j 6=i
b j). Sum up (F.4) for i, we have
λ ∗c (p
∗) =
1
I ∑i
mdi(p∗i )
With (F.2b), we have
b∗i (p
∗) = Di−∑
k
pk∗i −aλ ∗c (p∗)
⇐: if p∗ is the optimal solution of problem (18), then it
satisfies the KKT conditions (F.3). If we let
λc = −ξ ′∗ = 1I ∑i
mdi(p∗i ) (F.5a)
µi =
1
(I−1)a (Di−∑k
pk∗i )−λc (F.5b)
bi = Di− (aλc+∑
k
(pki )
∗) (F.5c)
pi = p∗i (F.5d)
Obviously, (F.2a) is satisfied. Sum up (F.5c) for all i together
with (F.3b) gives that
λc =− 1Ia∑i
bi
It is easy to check (F.2b) and (F.2c) are satisfied. Thus, (p∗,b∗)
is the NE of the sharing problem (15), which completes the
proof.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
Proof. We consider a special situation, where all the ci,∀i
equal to a same value c, and each prosumer possess the same
number of resource, which is KI . IKI is a fixed value equals
to N.
With the KKT condition (F.3), we have
2cpki +d
k
i +
Di− ∑
k∈Ki
pki
(I−1)a = −ξ
′
(G.1a)
∑
i
∑
k
pki = ∑
i
Di (G.1b)
Denote 2cpki + d
k
i as md
k
i . It is obvious that for all k ∈Ki,
mdki are equal, and so we use mdi to represent md
k
i for all k.
Sum up (G.1a) for all i and k, we have
2c∑
i
∑
k
pki +∑
i
∑
k
dki +
KI(∑
i
Di−∑
i
∑
k∈Ki
pki )
(I−1)a +Nξ
′
= 0 (G.2)
Together with (G.1b), it is easy to find that ξ ′ is independent
of I and ∑
i
mdi + Iξ
′
= 0. Assume that the optimal marginal
disutility is md∗i , then according to (G.1a), we have
Dl− ∑
k∈Ki
pk∗i
(I−1)a =−md
∗
i −ξ
′∗ (G.3)
The objective function (18a) can be rewritten as
pi := pi1+pi2
where
pi1 =∑
i
∑
k
[c(pk∗i )
2
+dki p
k∗
i ] =∑
i
∑
k
(md∗i )2− (dki )
2
4c
pi2 =−
∑
i
(Di− ∑
k∈Ki
pk∗i )
2
2(I−1)a =−
(I−1)a
2 ∑i
(md∗i +ξ
′∗)2
Then we have
pi1 = ∑
i
∑
k
(md∗i )2− (dki )
2
4c
=
KI
4c∑i
(md∗i )
2−∑
i
∑
k
(dki )
2
4c
=
KI
4c∑i
(md∗i +ξ
′∗)2+
N(ξ ′∗)2−∑
i
∑
k
(dki )
2
4c
(G.4)
The first term of (G.4) is variational and the second term is
a constant. So the change of pi1 is related with KI4c ∑
i
(md∗i +
ξ ′∗)2, the change of pi2 is related with − (I−1)a2 ∑
i
(md∗i +ξ
′∗)2
and the change of pi is related with KI−2ac(I−1)4c ∑
i
(md∗i +ξ
′∗)2.
Obviously, KI−2ac(I−1)4c is always positive for all I > 1.
Next, we define an equal partition such that pi is decreasing.
Assume that there is I multi-resource prosumers, and the
optimal output is pk∗i . Then we introduce competition and
allocate the resources owned by one prosumer and its demand
to Z ∈ Z+ prosumers such that I ′ = ZI and KI = ZKI′ , and
satisfies ∀i,∀z1,z2 ∈ {1, ...,Z}
(D
′
Z(i−1)+z1 −
K
I′
∑
k=1
pk∗
Z(i−1)+z1
)(D
′
Z(i−1)+z2 −
K
I′
∑
k=1
pk∗
Z(i−1)+z2
) ≥ 0
Z
∑
z=1
D
′
Z(i−1)+z = Di
Then
pi I∗ = pi I∗1 −∑
i
(Di−
KI
∑
k=1
pk∗i )
2
(I−1)a
= pi I∗1 −∑
i
(
Z
∑
z=1
D
′
Z(i−1)+z−
Z
∑
z=1
K
I′
∑
k=1
pk∗Z(i−1)+z)
2
(I−1)a
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≥ pi I∗1 −∑
i
Z
∑
z=1
(D
′
Z(i−1)+z−
K
I′
∑
k=1
pk∗Z(i−1)+z)
2
(I−1)a
≥ pi I∗1 −∑
i
Z
∑
z=1
(D
′
Z(i−1)+z−
K
I′
∑
k=1
pk∗Z(i−1)+z)
2
(I ′ −1)a
≥ pi I
′∗ (G.5a)
(G.5) tells us that the objective function pi decreases with
I. When I grows, the coefficient of pi1 (which is KI4c ) decreases
while the coefficient of pi2 (which is −(I−1)a2 ) increases. If
∑
i
(mdi + ξ
′
)2 decreases with I, then obviously pi1 decreases
with I. Otherwise, if ∑
i
(mdi + ξ
′
)2 increases with I, pi2 in-
creases with I. If pi1 also increases, then pi I∗ < pi I
′∗, which is
contradict to (G.5). In conclusion, we always have the social
total cost pi1 reduces with I, which means introducing effective
competition can improve social welfare.
Moreover, as K−2ac(I−1)4c is always positive and reaches
the minimum when I =
√−2ac/N. If √−2ac/N ≤ 1, then
K−2ac(I−1)
4c increases with I > 1, which tells that ∑
i
(mdi+ξ
′
)2
is decreasing in I, so that
Var(mdk∗i , I) =
1
N
I
∑
i=1
KI
∑
k=1
(mdk∗i +ξ
′
)2
=
KI
N
I
∑
i=1
(mdi+ξ
′
)2
≥ KI′
N
I
′
∑
i=1
(mdi+ξ
′
)2 =Var(mdk∗i , I
′
)
This completes the proof.
